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Alexa Sample 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States,
1
 two issues were before the court.  The 
first issue was whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) appeal of the district court’s 
affirmation of the BIA’s own decision presents a ―case or controversy‖ giving the appellate court 
jurisdiction,
2
 and whether the BIA nonetheless forfeited its standing by not taking an immediate 
interlocutory appeal of the remand order (Order).
3
  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
since the Order directed the result of the BIA’s decision on remand, the BIA retained an interest 
in the outcome sufficient to support an appeal.
 4
  The court also held that immediate appeal of the 
Order was inappropriate because such a remand is not generally appealable as it is not a final 
decision,
5
 and it did not meet the exceptions for ―practical finality.‖6  The second issue, on the 
merits of the BIA appeal, was whether the BIA’s denial of the transfer application was ―arbitrary 
and capricious, and contrary to law.‖7  The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied the Smith application based on the landholders best interests and the federal 
policy of avoiding fractionation of Indian lands.
8
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Miami Tribe left Indiana in 1840.
9
  Through a series of treaties with the United 
States that split the Tribe and ceded vast amounts of land in both Kansas and Indiana, the Tribe 
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finally settled in Oklahoma in 1867.
10
  In 1858, Maria Christiana DeRome petitioned Congress 
and was added to the list of Indiana Miamis even though she was not ―considered of Miami 
blood.‖11  The DeRome family was not recognized among Western Miamis,12 who were 
eventually compensated by Congress for money and land which was given to individuals, such 
as the DeRomes, and were erroneously added to the list in 1858.
13
  Smith, a descendent of Maria 
Christiana DeRome, inherited a 3/38 interest in the land now known as the Maria Christiana 
Reserve No. 35 (Reserve), which was held in restricted fee.  A 1996 amendment to the Miami 
Tribe’s constitution, added Smith and all other owners of the Reserve now including them as 
tribal members.
14
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Smith wished to gift a one-third portion of his interest in the Reserve to the Miami Tribe 
under the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA).
15
  He applied to the BIA for approval of the 
conveyance, as was required because of the restricted fee status of the land.
16
  The BIA denied 
the application and the Miami tribe brought a claim for abuse of discretion under the 
Administrative Procedures Act, among other claims.
17
  The district court found for the tribe on 
the reasoning that the tribe had jurisdiction over the land, and the BIA evaluation had failed to 
consider the Tribe’s best interests and the special relationship between Smith and the Tribe.18  
The district court remanded to the BIA to reconsider the application, which, after the court 
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rejected the BIA’s request for a Rule 54(b) judgment19 on the Order, was finally approved.20  The 
Tribe appealed the BIA’s denial of the trust status of the conveyance, and the district court 
affirmed.
21
  After the final decision, the BIA appealed.
22
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Jurisdiction and Standing of BIA Appeal 
Generally, the right to appeal is reserved for the aggrieved party.
23
  However, the party 
that technically prevails may still meet this requirement if it ―can demonstrate injury, causation, 
and redressability.‖24  The court articulated that the BIA could meet the injury requirement if the 
decision reached by the BIA which the district court upheld was one that the court had 
improperly imposed.
25
  The district court had originally directed the BIA to approve the 
application but amended its remand ordering the BIA to simply reconsider the application, taking 
into account the prescribed factors.
26
  The BIA argued that the district court’s jurisdictional 
finding essentially prescribed its decision, and the Tenth Circuit agreed.
27
 
On the issue of whether the BIA should have immediately appealed the Order, the court 
articulated it would be better to wait for the final judgment.
28
  Generally, interlocutory appeals 
are only appropriate in the case of ―practical finality.‖29  That is, ―when the lack of immediate 
review . . . would violate basic judicial principles,‖30 or if ―the agency likely would be foreclosed 
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from future appellate review.‖31  The former is only applied to important legal threshold 
questions where delayed review will lead to further disputes and injustice.
32
  The court held it 
would not apply to this case.
33
  Nor did the court find that the BIA would have been precluded 
from further appeal since two claims were still pending at the district court.
 34
 
B. De Novo Review on the Merits of the BIA’s Denial of the Smith Application 
The ILCA does not address the standard for BIA approval of land transactions, but the 
agency has promulgated its own regulatory guidelines which allow it to approve applications 
where, ―the transaction appears to be clearly justified in the light of the long-range best interest 
of the owner.‖35 
In reviewing the BIA’s decision, the court first addressed whether the Miami Tribe in fact 
had jurisdiction over the Reserve, as the district court found it had.  If jurisdiction was proper, it 
would implicate a statutory policy in favor of gifts like the Smith conveyance.
36
  A tribe’s 
jurisdiction must be based on congressional intent.
37
  The court found that the 1873 treaty and 
congressional acts expressly abrogated the Tribe’s authority over its Kansas lands.38  The Tribe’s 
active connection to the Reserve in recent years does not overcome such an abrogation. 
39
 
Without the jurisdictional requirement to compel its decision under ILCA, the BIA has 
wide latitude over land transfer decisions.
40
  The BIA decided that the transfer would not be in 
the best interests of the owners and that the existing lease with the Tribe could accomplish the 
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same benefits for the Tribe as a transfer would.
41
  It also cited concerns over transferring the land 
without compensation due to the ―gaming-related aspects of the Reserve.‖42  Moreover, the BIA 
argued that the lack of jurisdiction actually compelled it to deny the application based on another 
ILCA policy of avoiding further fractionalization of interests in Indian lands.
43
  The BIA claimed 
that further fractionation of interests complicated tract management.
44
  Citing Downs v. Acting 
Muskogee Area Director,
45
 the court agreed with the BIA’s argument.46  In Downs, the BIA 
denied a similar application for a gift of interest to the Miami Tribe, however, Downs is 
distinguished from the case at bar because the landowner in Downs was not a tribal member.
47
   
Based on Downs, the court of appeals vacated the Order, reversing the BIA, and remanded for 
further consideration.
48
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V.  CONCLUSION 
While the novelty of this case lies primarily in the unique procedural posturing of the 
BIA’s appeal, the history and the future of the case on the merits bears further discussion for 
Indian Law in general.  This was not the first time the Maria Christiana Reserve was the subject 
of litigation,
 49
 and with the level of discretion that the BIA exercises in its land into trust 
authority under ILCA, it is likely not to be the last.
50
  The court acknowledged that the statutory 
standard for the BIA’s approval of these applications is somewhat paternal, but nonetheless held 
that it is the choice of Congress, not the courts, to constrain an agency’s discretion.51 
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